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INTRODUCTION
Many people would consider simple assault to be a relatively
minor state misdemeanor offense that carries minimal punishment.
Simple assault cases are often tried before a judge without a jury1
and are many times the subject of a plea agreement. If the assailant
commits a simple assault on a person in a federally recognized
domestic relationship,2 that assault becomes a "misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence," a crime which prohibits the assailant from
future possession of a firearm3 and creates the possibility of
extremely harsh federal criminal sanctions. Simple assault--or any
other misdemeanor with an element of physical force-committed
against a domestic relation can be a predicate offense to federal
criminal firearm possession laws carrying fines of $250,000 and
sentences of ten years in federal prison.4
The federal government has codified the potential firearm
restriction for qualified domestic offenders in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9),
the Lautenberg Amendment, which subjects a criminal convicted
of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to a federal firearm
restriction. The Lautenberg Amendment is one of the recently
enacted federal criminal statutes dependent on the prosecution
of criminals under a state's substantive law.5 The use of state con-
victions and outcomes allows the state to "play a significant ...
substantive part in facilitating federal criminal justice policy and
goals."6 Some commentators have posited that using state criminal
proceedings as predicate offenses to federal firearms convictions
1. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1970) (allowing trial by judge alone
when potential penalty is less than six months but stating that "administrative conveniences
... can[not] ... justify denying an accused the important right to trial by jury where the possible
penalty exceeds six months' imprisonment.").
2. Federally recognized domestic relationships include "the spouse of the person, a
former spouse of the person, an individual who is a parent of a child of the person, and an
individual who cohabitates or has cohabited with the person." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(32) (2000).
3. Id. § 922(g)(9) (prohibiting anyone who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence from possessing a firearm).
4. Id. §§ 924(a)(2), 3571(d)(3)-(4).
5. For an in-depth discussion of the "infus[ion ofl federal law with the normative
judgments of the respective states," see Wayne A. Logan, Creating a "Hydra in Government".
Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 67 (2006).
6. Id. at 70.
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leads to (1) arbitrary application,7 and (2) "abdicat[ion] ... [of]
criminal lawmaking authority in deference to individual states."'
Federal courts interpreting federal statutes based on state substan-
tive law must directly face these two concerns.
Congress has made it easier to import state substantive law into
the federal system in limited instances, such as determining what
constitutes a "conviction."9 In other circumstances, however,
Congress has not given the federal courts clear guidance.
Section 922(g)(9) criminalizes the possession of firearms by
anyone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
containing an element of the "use or attempted use of physical
force."'10 Yet the circuit courts cannot agree on what amount of
"physical force" qualifies as a predicate state court offense. The
answer to the qualifying amount of "physical force" lies within the
state courts' own judicial determinations and can be found by
looking to the state courts to determine if the misdemeanor
offense contains an element of physical force. By allowing the use of
the state courts' determination, the federal courts infuse a bit of
arbitrariness into the federal system. After all, substantive ele-
ments and definitions of "assault" vary from state to state.
This Note discusses the effect of the disagreements among the
courts of appeals interpreting "physical force" in order to apply
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) to misdemeanant domestic offenders. Part I
examines the decisions by the federal courts and finds that three
different approaches to the issue exist: two based on strict statutory
construction and one openly accepting the infusion of state substan-
tive law. Part II discusses the practical impact of the debate over
"physical force" in § 922(g)(9) and its effect on federal prosecutions
and military service. Part II suggests that limited infusion of state
substantive law into the federal system-the interpretation of state
case law-allows the state prosecutor the broadest possible
discretion to confront the issue of domestic violence. Analyzing the
requisite amount of force in light of a state's substantive determina-
7. See id. at 90-96.
8. Id. at 85, 86-90.
9. See § 921(a)(20)(B) ("CWhat constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined
in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.").
10. Id. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).
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tions allows state prosecutors to ensure that the charged misde-
meanor is the most appropriate charge for the offense. In many
domestic violence situations, the answer is clear: society wants the
violent misdemeanant to lose his access to firearms. However, the
question of the requisite level of physical force is more difficult when
the offense is not "violent" but merely "offensive" or de minimis.
Using the state's substantive findings to guide the federal statute's
applicability helps to ensure that the prosecutor has the ability to
charge the offender appropriately, as the prosecutor understands
the amount of force needed for a state level conviction. This gives
the prosecution the ability to charge an offender under an alternate
statute if conviction would impose a federal firearm restriction,
which under the circumstances might be too great a criminal
sanction.
The Note concludes with a brief look at the practical impact that
the limited infusion of state substantive law, along with broad
prosecutorial discretion, has on law enforcement and the military,
two segments of society in which a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence is not only a threat to a domestic relationship, but also to
the law officer's or uniformed service member's career. Furthermore,
this infusion minimizes the possible "chilling effect" of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(9) in situations where a law enforcement officer or military
service member may have engaged in criminal conduct for which an
indefinite firearm restriction may be inappropriate.
I. "PHYSICAL FORCE" AND THE COURTS OF APPEALS
On July 17, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction of Jerry Lee Griffith for
possession of a firearm after his conviction under Georgia's simple
battery statute.' Griffith had beaten his wife and subsequently
pleaded guilty to two counts of violating Georgia's simple battery
statute, a misdemeanor. 2 Count one alleged that Griffith had made
"contact of an insulting and provoking nature to Delores Griffith,
his wife, by hitting her." 3 The second count, also for intentional
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"contact of an insulting and provoking nature," was for "dragging
her across the floor."'4 Two years later, Griffith was arrested for
possessing a firearm, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), the section of
the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) making it a felony for any
person who has been convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence" to possess either a firearm or ammunition that has
traveled in interstate commerce.15
A "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" has three elements
as defined by the United States Code. First, the crime must be "a
misdemeanor under Federal or State law."'6 Second, the crime must
"ha[vel, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or
the threatened use of a deadly weapon."'7 Third, the crime must be
committed against a person in a recognized domestic relationship to
the assailant." Griffith challenged his § 922(g)(9) conviction under
the theory that the Georgia statute failed to satisfy the second
element because it did not have an element of "physical force."' 9 The
Eleventh Circuit held that the Georgia statute, requiring the
intentional "physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature
with the person of another, 2' adequately satisfied the "physical
force" requirement explicit in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) and
implicit in § 922(g)(9).2'
Griffith was the most recent salvo fired between the courts of
appeals grappling with the interpretation and application of
§ 922(g)(9). With Griffith, the Eleventh Circuit joined the First,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits in the debate over what, as the Eleventh
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1340-41 (quoting § 922(g)(9)).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(i) (2000).
17. Id. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). In its entirety, the section reads,
(ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the
threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse,
parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a
child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has cohabited with the
victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a
spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.
Id.
18. Id. Importantly, the domestic relationship is codified in § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) and, thus,
may or may not be codified in the state statute.
19. Griffith, 455 F.3d at 1341.
20. Id. (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-23(a)(1) (2006)).
21. Id. at 1342.
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22Circuit stated, qualifies as "physical force" for § 922(g)(9) purposes.
At first glance, the majority of circuit courts to address the issue
agree with the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Griffith: any misde-
meanor with an element of use or attempted use of force can qualify
if committed against a domestic relation. 23 The Ninth Circuit stands
alone by holding that only "violent" physical force can bring a
misdemeanor under the purview of § 922(g)(9). 24
Close examination of the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits' reasonings leads to a conclusion that there are actually
three separate interpretations of "physical force" as it applies to
§ 922(g)(9): (1) that de minimis offensive contact qualifies the
misdemeanor, 25 (2) that, subject to state law interpretation, of-
fensive contact must be more than de minimis but need not rise to
the level of "violent" physical force,26 and (3) that the statutes
require "violent" physical force. 27 Following an assessment of the
reasoning behind each interpretation, it is apparent that the second
approach, a state law supported finding that physical force must be
more than just de minimis but need not rise to the level of "violent,"
most clearly aligns with the judicial history of the statutes and is
the most logical interpretation.
A. Majority Interpretation: 'Any" Physical Force
Of the four circuit courts that have directly addressed the
interpretation of "physical force" under § 922(g)(9), three have held
that any physical force could be enough to trigger the federal
statute, provided the state statute has a requirement of such force.28
22. Id. at 1341; see United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1066-68 (9th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 20-21 (lst Cir. 2001); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d
617, 619-21 (8th Cir. 1999). Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has addressed similar statutory
interpretations under 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2000). See Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir.
2003).
23. See Nason, 269 F.3d at 12; Smith, 171 F.3d at 619-21. As will be explained, although
Nason and Smith arrive at the same conclusion, their reasonings are quite different. Thus,
Nason will ultimately be viewed as creating a third analysis of the "physical force" debate.
24. See Belless, 338 F.3d at 1068.
25. See Griffith, 455 F.3d at 1342; Smith, 171 F.3d at 621.
26. See Nason, 269 F.3d at 19.
27. See Belless, 338 F.3d at 1068.
28. See Griffith, 455 F.3d at 1342-43; Nason, 269 F.3d at 15-21; Smith, 171 F.3d at 619-21.
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Although the three courts are in agreement as to the ultimate
result, they are not in agreement as to the reason. The Eleventh
Circuit in Griffith and the Eighth Circuit in Smith proceeded along
similar lines to reach their results.29 The reasoning is in marked
contrast to the reasoning of the First Circuit in Nason.3" Nason
merits its own discussion apart from Griffith and Smith.
Beginning its interpretation of§ 922(g)(9), the Griffith court made
it clear that it was engaging in an exercise of statutory interpreta-
tion and not a factual review of Jerry Griffith's conviction. The court
proceeded:
The question is not whether the actual conduct that led to
Griffith's prior conviction involved physical force or worse....
Wife beating and dragging is conduct that involves physical force
under any definition of that term. The ... definition ... does not
turn on the actual conduct underlying the conviction but on the
elements of the state crime.31
Statutorily, in order to determine whether Griffith's crime was a
qualifying misdemeanor under § 922(g)(9), the court must consider
whether the statute under which he pleaded guilty contained an
element of "the use or attempted use of physical force" under 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). The Griffith court reviewed the Georgia
simple battery statute under which Griffith pleaded guilty. The
statute stated that "[a] person commits the offense of simple battery
when he or she ...: (1) Intentionally makes physical contact of an
insulting or provoking nature with the person of another."32
In its interpretation of the Georgia statute, the Griffith court
looked at "the plain meaning of its words," namely the plain
meaning of "physical force" under § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).33 By comparing
29. See Griffith, 455 F.3d at 1342-43; Smith, 171 F.3d at 619-21.
30. Nason, 269 F.3d at 15-21.
31. Griffith, 455 F.3d at 1341; see also Smith, 171 F.3d at 620.
32. Griffith, 455 F.3d at 1341 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-23(a)(1) (2006)).
33. Id. at 1342 (quoting United States v. Maung, 267 F.3d 1113, 1121 (11th Cir. 2001));
see also Smith, 171 F.3d at 620. The Supreme Court explained "plain meaning" in these terms:
"It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the
language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, ... the sole function of the courts is
to enforce it according to its terms." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
Accordingly, "[tihis generally means when the language of the statute is clear and not
unreasonable or illogical in its operation, the court may not go outside the statute to give it
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the Georgia statute's definition of battery to the plain meaning of
"physical force," the court determined that "[a] person cannot make
physical contact-particularly of an insulting or provoking nature
-with another without exerting some level of physical force." 4
Under this point-by-point, element-by-element approach, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed Griffith's conviction.35
The Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Griffith is very similar to the
Eighth Circuit's analysis in Smith. However, in Smith, the Eighth
Circuit confronted a domestic assault that, under Iowa's bifurcated
assault law, could have been either (1) an "act ... intended to
cause pain or injury," or (2) an "act ... intended to place another in
fear of immediate physical contact."36 The Eighth Circuit recog-
nized that an Iowa assault conviction of an act "placing another in
fear of imminent physical contact" would not qualify under §
921(a)(33)(A)(ii) because there would be no element of either "use or
attempted use of force. 37
Focusing on the conviction as an "act ... intended to cause pain
or injury," the Eleventh Circuit found in Griffith that any amount
of "physical force" qualified.3" In order to bolster its finding, the
Eleventh Circuit examined the "close neighbor of the statutory
provision" it was interpreting.39 The Eleventh Circuit considered 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii), which comes immediately before § 922(g)(9)
in the United States Code.4"
Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) concerns the use of firearms by any
person subject to a protective order.4' In this neighboring section,
the United States Code contains limiting and clarifying language
absent from § 922(g)(9). This language states that it is unlawful for
any person subject to a court order that "by its terms explicitly
prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
a different meaning." 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46:01 (6th ed. 2000).
34. Griffith, 455 F.3d at 1342.
35. Id. at 1340-45.
36. Smith, 171 F.3d at 620; see IOWA CODE § 708.1 (2005).
37. Smith, 171 F.3d at 620.
38. Griffith, 455 F.3d at 1342-43.
39. Id. at 1342.
40. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) (2000).
41. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).
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... that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury"2 to
possess a firearm. The omission of the words "reasonably be
expected to cause bodily injury" in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) suggested
to the Eleventh Circuit that any amount of physical force involved
in a misdemeanor conviction would qualify under § 922(g)(9), even
offensive touching.43 The court quoted the Supreme Court to
emphasize the significance of the omission: "It is well settled that
where Congress includes particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is gener-
ally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.""
Quite contrary to the Eleventh Circuit's finding, it is not entirely
clear that the omission of that language should be subject to a
presumption of "disparate exclusion" by Congress. First, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) and § 922(g)(9), although part of the same section
of the United States Code, are very different in origin. They are not
part of a comprehensive alteration to Title 18 but were enacted
several years apart by separate acts45 and address separate factual
considerations.4" Second, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) was the product of
several years of work and revisions.47 The quality of the final
version of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) has been debated. Some have
suggested that "[t]he final version of the law was poorly drafted and
internally inconsistent."4 Although the circuits have seized upon
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. See Griffith, 455 F.3d at 1342-43.
44. Id. at 1342 (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 173 (2001)) (internal citation,
quotation marks, and alteration omitted).
45. Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) was enacted as part of the Violent Gun Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110401, 108 Stat. 1796, 2015 (1994). Section
922(g)(9) was enacted as part of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 658x7, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009x372 (1996). The quoted language in Griffith from
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. at 173, refers to the interpretation of three sections of 28 U.S.C.:
§§ 2244, 2254, and 2261. See Griffith, 455 F.3d at 1342. Congress adopted each of these
sections as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
46. Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) addresses firearm possession following the issuance of a
protective order or restraining order. Section 922(g)(9), as has been stated, addresses
possession of a firearm following conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.
47. See Tom Lininger, A Better Way To Disarm Batterers, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 525, 551-58
(2003) (outlining the history of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)).
48. Id. at 556. The D.C. Circuit has even commented on its difficulty interpreting 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) in United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In Barnes,
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the absence of the words "reasonably be expected to cause bodily
injury" from § 922(g)(9), the intentional omission of that language
remains open to debate.
The practical effect of the interpretation of "physical force" under
Griffith is to qualify misdemeanants under § 922(g)(9) who have
been convicted of crimes involving "offensive contact" that can be as
slight as insolent contact with another person's glasses or hitting
someone with a paper airplane.4 9 This interpretation makes no
allowance for domestic offenders guilty of "offensive physical con-
tact," but subjects them to the same punishments as domestic
offenders guilty of "violent physical contact." In a pragmatic sense
this does not matter in a factual situation that mirrors Griffith or
Smith; the offenders in each of those cases had committed violent
physical assaults on their domestic partners.
B. United States v. Belless: 'Violent" Physical Force
In opposition to the holdings in Griffith and Smith, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the statutory interpretation of
"physical force" under 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) and 922(g)(9) in
United States v. Belless.5° Robert Belless was convicted of violating
a Wyoming assault and battery statute after he "assault[ed] Kristen
Belless-grabbing her chest/neck area and pushing her against her
car in an angry manner."'" Belless was indicted six years later for
possession of a firearm after having been convicted of the misde-
meanor crime of domestic violence." Belless appealed on two
grounds: (1) that the Wyoming statute did not have an element
requiring a domestic relationship, and (2) that the Wyoming statute
"embrace[d] conduct that does not include 'use or attempted use of
physical force. '
the court stated, "[n]eedless to say, if the Congress had more precisely articulated its
intention, our task would have been easier." Id. at 1361.
49. These examples are drawn from Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Flores v. Ashcroft, 350
F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2003). Easterbrook has difficulty with the force requirements in some
statutes, raising the pertinent question, "How is it possible to commit any offense without
applying a dyne of force?" Id. at 672.
50. 338 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003).
51. Id. at 1065.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1065, 1067.
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Noting that "[a]ny touching constitutes 'physical force' in the
sense of Newtonian mechanics,"54 the Ninth Circuit went on to hold
that the "physical force to which the federal statute refers is not de
minimis."5 The Ninth Circuit interpreted the Wyoming statute
under which Belless was convicted as "criminalizing conduct that is
minimally forcible, though ungentlemanly."56
The Wyoming statute's intent, as understood by the Ninth
Circuit, was to "enable police to arrest people in such confrontations
in order to avoid the risk that rude touchings will escalate into
violence."5 Predicate offenses for the federal statute that require
the "use or attempted use of physical force" did not "include mere
impolite behavior."5 8 The Wyoming statute certainly could include
violent physical force but was not limited to such force; therefore,
the court held that "physical force" under § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) had to
be "violent use of physical force against the body of another individ-
ual."59
Although the Ninth Circuit's holding is currently the minority
position and stands against the holdings of three other circuits, the
implications derived from Belless are telling. Belless is concerned
with the possibility that finding any convicted misdemeanant liable
under § 922(g)(9) may overemphasize the predicate act. The court
recognized that Belless was violent in his actions toward his wife
but still overturned his conviction under § 922(g)(9).6 ° The Ninth
Circuit, however, made its determination not based on the predicate
act itself, but on the Wyoming statute, which can be interpreted as
54. Id. at 1067.
55. Id. at 1068.
56. Id. The Wyoming statute defined Belless's crime as "unlawfully touch[ing] another in
a rude, insolent or angry manner or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily
injury to another." Id. at 1065 (quoting WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-501(b) (2003)).
57. Id. at 1068. This statute intends arrest before "rude touchings" escalate into "violence."
§ 6-2-501(b). This embodies a preemptive purpose of the qualifying misdemeanor. As discussed
below, the legislative history of § 922(g)(9) indicates that the federal statute has a reactive
purpose, namely to prevent possession of firearms by those who have pleaded down a felony
to a misdemeanor. Identifying this distinction is important because the emphasis on the
quantum of physical force under the state statute here is minor force with a potentially
violent outcome. That is the opposite of the would-be felon who has pleaded down his violent
crime to a lesser misdemeanor and who is therefore targeted by § 922(g)(9).
58. Belless, 338 F.3d at 1068.
59. Id.
60. ' The record indicates that Belless was charged with conduct that was a violent act and
not merely a rude or insolent touching." Id. at 1068-69.
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applying to either violent or offensive contact.6 The court would not
engage in speculation as to which type of conduct Robert Belless
pleaded guilty." Furthermore, the court showed concern that
insolent and rude touchings may well "escalate into violence" but
there is no clear indication that such escalation occurs with each
insolent touch.6"
C. United States v. Nason: State Court Interpretations
The First Circuit considered the definition of "physical force"
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33) and 922(g)(9) after the United States
District Court for the District of Maine handed down two conflicting
rulings on motions defining those statutes. 4 The First Circuit's
decision in United States v. Nason ultimately reached the same
results as the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits in Smith and Griffith,
respectively. The First Circuit held that "assault regulated under
Maine's general-purpose assault statute necessarily involve[s] the
use of physical force. As a result, all convictions under that statute
for assaults upon persons in the requisite relationship status qualify
as misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence within the purview of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)."'" In reaching its conclusion, the First Circuit,
as the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits had done, looked to the
statute's plain meaning,6 the omission of pertinent language from
§ 922(g)(9)'s preceding subsection, 7 and the section's legislative
history.6"
61. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
62. BeUess, 338 F.3d at 1069.
63. Id. at 1068. The Ninth Circuit drew a parallel to a confrontation between Vice
President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev in which Nixon "jabb[ed] the
Soviet Premier's chest with his pointed finger." Id. The anecdote continued that "both men,
though perhaps exaggerating their [elffect for the crowd, looked 'angry."' Id. This action could
have constituted an offensive-conduct assault by Nixon against Khrushchev. There was,
however, little chance the two world leaders' confrontation would escalate to the point of
violent physical contact.
64. See United States v. Nason, No. 00-CR-37-B-S, 2001 WL 123722 (D. Me. Feb. 13,
2001); United States v. Southers, No. 00-83-P-H, 2001 WL 9863 (D. Me. Jan. 3, 2001).
65. United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 21 (1st Cir. 2001).
66. Id. at 16.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 17.
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To be clear, the First Circuit found that any physical force,
however slight, can qualify as an offense under § 922(g)(9). 9 What
separates Nason from both Smith and Griffith is how the First
Circuit attempted to interpret the underlying state statute on which
Nason pleaded guilty. Giving deference to Maine's Supreme Court,
the First Circuit engaged in a detailed analysis of Maine's assault
statute and what qualified as "a sufficient actus reus."7 °
The facts of Nason are common. Nason pleaded guilty to violating
Maine's general-purpose assault statute and received a three-day
jail sentence. 1 Maine's assault statute, like many state assault
statutes, is divided into two sections that provide that a person may
be guilty of a misdemeanor assault if "the person intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly causes [either] bodily injury ... to another"
or "offensive physical contact" with another.72 The assault to which
Nason pleaded did not specify whether the contact was assault
leading to "bodily injury" or to "offensive physical contact."73 The
First Circuit, considering that the state courts could have found
Nason guilty under one of two theories (bodily injury or offensive
physical contact), readily determined that a conviction under a
theory of "bodily injury" would satisfy the physical force require-
ment required in § 922(g)(9).74 The First Circuit's interpretation of
"offensive physical contact" required deeper analysis.
The review of Maine's criminal cases indicated to the First Circuit
that Maine had adopted an interpretation of "offensive physical
contact" that entailed "something less than bodily injury ... but
require[d] more than a mere touching of another." 5 The Maine
69. "The substitution of 'physical force' as the operative mode of aggression element
effectively expanded the coverage of § 922(g)(9) to include predicate offenses whose formal
statutory definitions contemplated the use of any physical force, regardless of whether that
force resulted in bodily injury or risk of harm." Id. at 17-18.
70. Id. at 18.
71. Id. at 12.
72. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 207(1) (2005).
73. Nason, 269 F.3d at 18. The state courts in Georgia and Wyoming had also failed to
specify whether the guilty pleas of Griffith and Belless were for assaults that caused bodily
injury or offensive contact (or if the determination was made, it was not acknowledged by the
federal courts in the prosecution under § 922(g)(9)). See United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d
1339, 1340 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003).
74. "Common sense supplies the missing piece of the puzzle: to cause physical injury, force
necessarily must be physical in nature." Nason, 269 F.3d at 20.
75. Id. at 19 (quoting State v. Pozzuoli, 693 A.2d 745, 747 (Me. 1997)).
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Supreme Court, in State v. Pozzuoli, ultimately applied the 'reason-
able person' standard to determine whether a contact [was] offen-
sive."76 The implicit suggestion from the First Circuit was that,
regardless of whether Nason had actually committed assault
leading to "bodily injury" or "offensive physical contact," the deter-
mination was for the state court alone. The First Circuit needed
only to consider the conviction under the Maine general-purpose
assault statute. "As a result," the Circuit concluded in its discussion
of reconciling the federal and state statutes, "all convictions under
[Maine's assault statute] for assaults upon persons in the requisite
relationship qualify as misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence.""
The practical effect of the First Circuit's decision cannot be
overstated. By addressing the judicial decisions of Maine courts
interpreting Maine's assault statute, the First Circuit has allowed
the state to determine the qualifying misdemeanors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(9). This interpretation is in marked contrast with either the
Eighth or the Eleventh Circuit, both of which failed to consider any
judicial decision from Iowa or Georgia, respectively.7" But, it was a
point of state law that, in Nason, proved essential: even if Nason's
assault conviction were for "offensive contact," the Maine courts
would not have convicted him without determining that "a reason-
able person would find the contact to be offensive."79 Without the
state court conviction, Nason would not have had a misdemeanor
conviction to subject him to federal prosecution under § 922(g)(9).
Understood this way, a state's prior judicial decisions provide
the limiting and qualifying language to § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) and
§922(g)(9). If a state's court has limited the interpretation of
76. Id. (quoting Pozzuoli, 693 A.2d at 747-48). The Nason court further distinguished
"touchings" and "offensive physical contact," finding "[t]wo factors distinguish mere touchings
from offensive physical contacts: the mens rea requirement ... and the application of a
'reasonable person' standard to determine whether a contact is offensive." Id.; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 (2004) ("A bodily contact is offensive if it offends a
reasonable sense of personal dignity.").
77. Nason, 269 F.3d at 21.
78. The Eighth Circuit considered the interpretation of Iowa Code § 708.1 in United States
v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617,620 (8th Cir. 1999), but did not cite a single Iowa case interpretingthe
requisite level of "physical force" under that statute. The same is true of the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion of Griffith interpreting Georgia's assault statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-23(a) (2006),
which did not cite any Georgia cases interpreting "physical force" under that statute. Griffith,
455 F.3d at 1341.
79. Pozzuoli, 693 A.2d at 747; see also State v. Rembert, 658 A.2d 656, 657-58 (Me. 1997).
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"offensive physical contact" (or other element of the state's assault
statute) to eliminate what could be considered the "use of force or
attempted use of force" element, the federal court should not read
such language back into the statute. ° Consideration of a state's
case law provides the prosecuting attorney the widest latitude to
prosecute the domestic offender properly. Knowing the requisite
quantum of "physical force" necessary for a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence conviction allows the prosecuting attorney to
select the appropriate statute under which to charge the offender.
This eliminates any potential concerns of those courts that would
require "violent physical force" or a higher level of force to counter-
act possible prosecutions for hitting someone with a paper airplane
or snowball."' Absent those limiting state court decisions, the
federal court has complete discretion to conclude that any amount
of "physical force" as an element of a state court misdemeanor will
qualify for possible conviction under § 922(g)(9).
Some commentators have challenged the appropriateness of
using state law as a guide for predicate offense interpretation. The
argument proceeds that the legislative intent shows that Senator
Lautenberg, the sponsor of § 922(g)(9), "sought to ensure that his
new law would be applied uniformly to reach any conviction for
an act involving domestic violence, notwithstanding the vagaries
of state statutory definitions."82 The Supreme Court's decision in
Taylor v. United States makes it clear that "absent plain indication
to the contrary, federal laws are not to be construed so that their
application is dependent on state law."8 3 The Nason line of reason-
80. The Ninth Circuit seemed to agree with this line of reasoning, recognizing that Nason
was not at odds with its determination in Belless. "Our analysis is not in conflict with the
First Circuit's decision that a Maine statute that criminalized 'offensive physical contact'
furnished a predicate for conviction under § 922(g)(9).... Mhe Maine statute, though broad,
had been narrowed by caselaw to 'require ... more than a mere touching of another."' United
States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). The Ninth
Circuit did not, however, cite a single Wyoming case to indicate or support its position that
the Wyoming statute criminalizes "ungentlemanly" conduct as opposed to "violent" physical
contact. Id. Had it done so, Nason and Belless would be quite similar in analysis.
81. See Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2003).
82. Lininger, supra note 47, at 558 nn.150-51.
83. 495 U.S. 575, 591 (1990) (citing Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103,
119-20 (1983)). Several of the circuit courts have considered the categorical approach utilized
by the Court in Taylor, but none has found it applicable. See, e.g., Griffith, 455 F.3d at 1341;
United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2001); Smith, 171 F.3d at 620-21.
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ing does not attempt to make the application of the federal law
"dependent on state law," though, to some extent, that is the result.
Stated most simply, there cannot be a conviction under a state's
misdemeanor domestic violence statutes absent that state's judicial
interpretation of its own statutes. Without a state conviction, no
predicate offense exists for which to convict a misdemeanant under
§ 922(g)(9).8 4 This interpretation is consistent with Taylor, and does
not require the federal court to "engage in an elaborate factfinding
process regarding the defendant's prior offenses,"8 because all
factual determinations have already been made by the state court.
D. Clarification or Confusion?: The Legislative History of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)
Smith and Nason each considered the legislative history of
§ 922(g)(9), specifically the words of its proponent, Senator Frank
Lautenberg.86 Of the four circuit courts to address the definition
of "physical force" under § 922(g)(9), neither the Ninth Circuit nor
the Eleventh Circuit considered the legislative history.87 Courts
generally approach the statutory interpretation of § 922(g)(9) by
utilizing the statute's "plain language" or "plain meaning" and only
turn to the legislative history when the interpretation is ambiguous
84. The Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Brailey, 408 F.3d 609 (9th Cir. 2005)
might be a good example of federal laws not "be[ing] construed so that their application is
dependent on state law," as was the Supreme Court's concern in Taylor, 495 U.S. at 591. In
Brailey, the Ninth Circuit found that even though the Utah misdemeanor conviction did not
result in a prohibition on the offender's firearm possession under state law, the federal law
controlled the right under the federal statute. Brailey, 408 F.3d at 612-13.
Brailey also concerned the determination of what constituted a "conviction" under state law.
Under the federal firearm statutes, Congress granted the authority to determine "conviction"
under the state law: "What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held." 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(20)(B) (2000). Thus, the state's judicial determinations provide the limitations for a
conviction.
85. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601. The First Circuit, in dicta, distinguished Taylor's approach
dealing with sentencing guidelines from using a categorical approach to determine state
predicate offenses that would constitute an element of the federal crime. The First Circuit
declined to address the issue. Nason, 269 F.3d at 15 n.3.
86. Senator Frank Lautenberg discussed the adoption of § 922(g)(9) as part of the
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
Lautenberg's comments are located at 142 CONG. REC. S11872, S118676-78 (1996) (statement
of Sen. Lautenberg). See also Nason, 269 F.3d at 17; Smith, 171 F.3d at 625.
87. See Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339; United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003).
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or to provide confirmation for their interpretation." With the circuit
courts unable to determine what level of "physical force" qualifies as
a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence for treatment under §
922(g)(9), arguably some ambiguity exists in the federal statute's
interpretation.
Addressing the Senate, Senator Lautenberg gave his vision of
the woman that the "Lautenberg Amendment" aimed to protect.
Lautenberg related a fictional account of the "ordinary American
woman" who was married to someone. who is "generally a decent,
law-abiding guy." 9 This "guy," according to Lautenberg's hypotheti-
cal story, "loses his temper because his emotions get the best of him
... loses control, flies into a rage and then strikes out violently at
those closest to him."' According to Lautenberg, this man has been
punished for his actions before. "Once he beat his wife brutally and
was prosecuted, but like most wife beaters, he pleaded down to a
misdemeanor and got away with a slap on the wrist."91 At the
hypothetical's conclusion, the man has one more fight with his wife,
one that escalates out of control, and "with one hand he will strike
his wife and with the other hand he will reach for the gun he keeps
in his drawer .... [Tihis woman ... will die or be severely wounded."92
With this image, Senator Lautenberg began his discussion of the
proposed legislation's impact and purpose. The story is instructive
in several respects. First, the hypothetical domestic offender com-
mitted a brutal, violent act against his spouse. Senator Lautenberg's
offender did not commit a de minimis simple assault, although that
may have been the ultimate charge. Second, Senator Lautenberg's
hypothetical domestic offender was prosecuted for his crime but was
able to plead to a misdemeanor. The hypothetical implies that the
88. See, e.g., United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 219 (lst Cir. 1999). "When ... the plain
language of a statute unambiguously reveals its meaning, and the revealed meaning is not
eccentric, courts need not consult other aids to statutory construction." Id. The First Circuit
continued to say that "[firom time to time ... courts (perhaps manifesting a certain
institutional insecurity) employ such secondary sources as a means of confirmation." Id.
Meade involved a challenge to a conviction under § 922(g)(9), specifically addressing whether
Congress intended that only misdemeanor convictions under a state statute which explicitly
contained a domestic relation element could serve as predicate offenses. Id. at 218.
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prosecution considered felony charges against the offender but for
some reason chose to proceed with a misdemeanor charge.
Lautenberg's language only gives an image of what is, perhaps,
one view of many possible applications of the legislation.
Lautenberg may have described the image while on the floor of the
Senate in order to sway his colleagues to support the legislation.
Perhaps Lautenberg chose the image of a serious incident, one that
would assuredly fall under the legislation, without intending to
suggest that lesser misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence would
not fall under the legislation's gambit.
When Senator Lautenberg directly addressed the statute's
language, his statements were especially important. Lautenberg
stated that the statute's final draft included the element of "the
use or attempted use of physical force."93 Lautenberg noted that
previous versions of the bill did not include the language "crimes
involving an attempt to use force ... if such an attempt ... did not also
involve actual physical violence."94 Lautenberg concluded, "In my
view, anyone who attempts or threatens violence against a loved one
has demonstrated that he or she poses an unacceptable risk, and
should be prohibited from possessing firearms."95
In Nason, the First Circuit incompletely quoted other language of
the statute and may have misinterpreted the statute in its entirety.
The Nason court determined "that Senator Lautenberg's statements
... indicate[d] that a principal purpose underlying Congress's sub-
stitution of 'crimes involving the use or attempted use of physical
force' for 'crimes of violence' in section 922(g)(9) was to broaden the
spectrum of predicate offenses covered by the statute."96
In fact, Lautenberg never suggested that the substitution of
"crimes involving the use or attempted use of physical force" for
"crimes of violence" was intended to broaden the scope of§ 922(g)(9).
Instead, the First Circuit overlooked Lautenberg's comments on
the statute's original version. Lautenberg directly addressed the
original version that contained the language "crime of violence."
93. Id. at Sl1877.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id. (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit in United States v. White, 258 F.3d 374 (5th
Cir. 2001) determined whether mere threats could count as a predicate offense to prosecution
under § 922(g)(9). White is discussed briefly infra at notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
96. United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 2001).
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Stating that "[s]ome argued that the term crime of violence was too
broad, and could be interpreted to include an act such as cutting
up a credit card with a pair of scissors,"9 Lautenberg found this
concern "far-fetched" but agreed "to a new definition of covered
crimes that is more precise, and probably broader."9 " The result was
that the original draft was altered at the behest of those who hoped
to narrow the scope of the statute, though, as Lautenberg correctly
pointed out, this might have resulted in inadvertently broadening
its scope.99
The First Circuit also did not verbalize any consideration of
Lautenberg's statements that, in his view, "anyone who attempts or
threatens violence against a loved one has demonstrated that he
or she poses an unacceptable risk, and should be prohibited from
possessing firearms."' 0 The continued use of the word "violent" by
Senator Lautenberg is significant. The codified version of § 922(g)(9)
does not include the word "violent" or any derivation of the word.
Yet, perhaps not surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit held in Belless
that "physical force," as it applies to § 922(g)(9), is the "violent use
of force against the body of another individual,"'0 ' language which
is reminiscent of Lautenberg's statements in the Congressional
Record. When coupled with Lautenberg's statements about his
concerns regarding domestic offenders who are able to plead down
a felony charge to a misdemeanor (a fact not applicable to every
domestic violence situation), the legislative history of the statute
becomes quite unclear and lends support to both the First Circuit's
opinion in Nason and the Ninth's in Belless. 02
97. 142 CONG. REC. S11872, S11877 (1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
98. Id.
99. Id. Had those members of Congress succeeded in narrowing the scope of the
Lautenberg Amendment, this analysis would possibly be unnecessary. "Physical force" would
almost certainly require violent physical contact.
100. Id.(emphasis added).
101. United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003).
102. Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit in Smith recognized that Congress was "concerned
with domestic abuse offenders who were successful in pleading a felony charge down to a
misdemeanor and thus escap[ed] the effect of the felon-in-possession statutes." United States
v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 625 (8th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). Again, the Eighth Circuit has
recognized that the offender in question may have been charged under felony statutes. See id.
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II. COMBATING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CRIMES AND PROSECUTIONS
The Department of Justice's figures have indicated that family
violence constituted 11 percent of the total number of reported and
unreported acts of violence between 1998 and 2002.103 This figure
only begins to detail the terrible plague that domestic violence is on
society, and it does so only in a sterile and distanced manner.
Quantified differently, 11 percent of the total number of reported
and unreported acts of violence for that period encompasses
approximately 3.5 million violent crimes against family members."°4
Tracking domestic violence adjudication at the state court level,
the Department of Justice has concluded that approximately 71.3
percent of adjudicated family assault cases result in convictions,
48.1 percent for felonies, and 23.2 percent for misdemeanors.
10 5
Approximately one quarter of family assault cases did not result in
conviction, mostly due to dismissal.' 6
Considering that 11 percent of all reported and unreported
violence results from family violence, intuition suggests that the
number of convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) would be
substantial. However, the number of suspects referred to the U.S.
Attorney for possible prosecution under § 922(g)(9) is incredibly
low. For the period between 2000 and 2002, only 630 suspects
were referred to U.S. Attorneys for possession of a firearm after a
previous conviction for domestic violence.'0 7 That figure does not
distinguish between convictions for felonies or misdemeanors. From
2000 to 2002 the total number of federal suspects was 18,653; the
630 referrals for firearm violations by felons/misdemeanants in
possession following domestic violence conviction accounts for
approximately 3.4 percent-of the referrals.
0 8
The empirical data is clear: in its current form § 922(g)(9) protects
victims of domestic violence from domestic offenders who wish to
103. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, NCJ 207846, FAMILY VIOLENCE
STATISTICS INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 1 (2005), available at
http://ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf [hereinafter FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS].
104. Id.
105. Id. at 49.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 51.
108. Id.
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purchase firearms and not necessarily from those who already
possess them. Senator Frank Lautenberg recently recognized the
importance of his legislation codified in § 922(g)(9) at a ceremony in
Washington, D.C. The official report from the office of Senator
Lautenberg mentions only the number of gun purchases denied as
a result of § 922(g)(9) and does not mention any convictions under
the statute. 10 9 Senator Lautenberg's office reported a significant
number of attempted purchases prevented through the statute:
approximately 150,000 since 1996."' This is a substantial figure,
especially when it is compared to the number of federal prosecutions
for firearm possession by domestic offenders. The question remains,
however, as to whether the difficulty interpreting § 922(g)(9) affects
potential prosecutions of misdemeanant domestic offenders.
Three interpretations of § 922(g)(9) are promulgated under the
Smith/Griffith analysis,"' the Nason analysis," 2 and the Belless
analysis." 3 Whether any of these interpretations will affect the
prosecutions of those misdemeanants who possess firearms remains
to be seen. The low number of federal prosecutions tends to indicate
one or more of the following: (1) a lack of federal resources to
adequately prosecute firearm offenses, (2) state preference to charge
domestic offenders under non-predicate offenses under the state's
law, (3) compliance with possession laws following misdemeanor
domestic violence conviction by the misdemeanant, (4) judicial
nullification by the federal courts, (5) restoration of rights, (6)
failure to charge offenses in the federal system, or (7) a combination
of these factors.
As a federal firearms offense, § 922(g)(9) is wholly reliant upon a
conviction for a state misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. If one
assumes that § 922(g)(9) should be interpreted as in the First
109. OFFICE OF SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE GUN BAN TEN
YEARS LATER: LIVES SAVED, ABUSERS DENIED 2 (2006), available at http://lautenberg.
senate.gov/newsroom/documents.cfm (follow 'The Domestic Violence Gun Ban Report"
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 7, 2008).
110. Id. See also Press Release, Office of Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, On 10th
Anniversary of Domestic Violence Gun Ban, Lautenberg Report Shows Law's Impact (Oct. 6,
2006), available at http://lautenberg.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=264502&&.
111. United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Smith, 171
F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1999).
112. United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2001).
113. United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Circuit's opinion in Nason, which allowed the state court's decisions
to create the limitations on what qualifies for the predicate amount
of "physical force," 114 the effect on federal prosecutions would most
likely be unchanged. Such an interpretation would, however, grant
the state prosecutor the greatest authority to effectuate the state's
criminal sanctions on a domestic offender and ultimately affect the
convicted criminal's ability to possess a firearm under the federal
misdemeanant in possession statute.
A. Society's Response: Police and State Prosecutorial Discretion
Social response to combat domestic violence begins not with the
prosecution of domestic violence cases but with local arrest policies.
Currently all states, with the exception of Arkansas, have either
pro-arrest policies or more proactive mandatory arrest policies.115
However, "[e]ven in jurisdictions with mandatory arrest policies,
police generally have some discretion about whether to make an
arrest on a domestic disturbance call.""' 6 Police discretion to arrest
at the scene of a domestic disturbance is contingent on a number
of "extralegal" factors: seriousness of injury, gender, marital status
of complainant, and intoxication." 7 The effect of pro-arrest and
mandatory arrests is unclear. There has been some indication that
mandatory arrests can lead to an increase in dual arrests (arrests
of both domestic partners) and may lead to a "decrease in domestic
disturbance calls."" 8
Aside from the responding officer's discretion to press an arrest
incident to a domestic disturbance, the charging discretion falls to
114. Nason, 269 F.3d at 17-21.
115. See DENISE A. HINES & KATHLEEN MALLEY-MORRISON, FAMILY VIOLENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES 306 (2005).
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Id. The reason for the increase in dual arrests is currently being debated. On one
hand, dual arrests may indicate that violence in the home is "mutual between the partners,"
or, conversely, that it is "one more way of blaming the victim and further victimizing women."
Id.
Another commentator noted that by removing the discretion to arrest, the mandatory arrest
policy makes a social statement about the serious nature of domestic violence and "helps
counter the general reluctance of courts to extend to women the civil rights protection granted
to racial minorities." Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrest of Batterers: A Reply to Its Critics, in Do
ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 129 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996).
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the prosecutor. Not long ago, commentators viewed prosecutors not
as facilitating the prosecution of domestic offenders, but as hinder-
ing it. As illustrative of the prosecution's attitude toward a domestic
abuser, consider:
Prosecutors were said to be at best, apathetic toward, and at
worst, disdainful of prosecuting domestic violence cases because
of their purported perceptions that domestic violence cases were
trivial or difficult to prosecute successfully, especially if victims
were reluctant to serve as witnesses. As a result of this pessi-
mism, the past had been witness to the use of prosecutorial
discretion to discourage the filing of domestic violence com-
plaints."'
That pervasive attitude has shifted, and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is
emblematic of the recognition that domestic violence is a serious
social problem. The state prosecutor will make the charging
decision, and that decision is made "virtually free from judicial
control.""12 "The charging decision is the heart of the prosecution
function."'' The American Bar Association (ABA) has outlined a
series of factors to be considered in charging a criminal defendant,
including (1) the prosecutor's "reasonable doubt" in the suspect's
guilt, (2) the amount of harm that occurred because of the offense,
(3) the proportion of punishment to the offense or offender, (4) any
improper motivation by the complaining party, (5) whether the vic-
tim is willing to testify, and (6) any assistance from the suspect.122
Furthermore, the ABA has stated that the "prosecutor may in some
circumstances and for good cause consistent with the public interest
decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may
exist which would support a conviction.' 23
119. Donald J. Rebovich, Prosecution Response to Domestic Violence: Results of a Survey
of Large Jurisdictions, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 118, at
176-77.
120. JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 3.09 (3d ed. 2003).
121. AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION 72 (3d ed. 1993).
122. Id. at 71.
123. Id. Of course, the "no-drop" policy in some jurisdictions is the prosecutorial corollary
to the mandatory arrest mentioned supra notes 115-18. See Erin L. Han, Note, Mandatory
Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 159 (2003).
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Officers responding to domestic disturbances witness assaults in
upwards of a third of those disturbances, 1 4 and this should negate
the prosecutor's "reasonable doubt" in the domestic offender's guilt.
The harm witnessed in these calls can be substantial, with injuries
at police-attended domestic disturbances occurring 36 percent of the
time.'25 The difficult charging issues are not, then, "reasonable
doubt" and harm. Thus, the six ABA charging standards, if utilized
consciously by the prosecutor in a domestic violence case, should
often lead to a decision to charge a domestic offender. The difficulty
lies in the issues of proportional punishment, improper motivation,
and victim willingness to testify.
The impact of § 922(g)(9) directly correlates to the proportionality
of the punishment and, although a federal crime, could play an
important role in the decision to charge a misdemeanant offender
under state law. The most common domestic violence offense is
simple assault.'26 The criminal sanction resulting from a simple
assault conviction is much smaller than the resulting conviction
of possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(9). For example, in Smith,
the predicate simple assault resulted in a fine of $100,127 and in
Nason the predicate assault resulted in a "three-day jail sen-
tence."'28 A conviction under § 922(g)(9), on the other hand, can lead
to a sentence of up to ten years in prison'29 and will result in the
inability to possess a firearm absent restoration of rights. 130
Regardless of constitutional challenges to the proportionality of the
federal possession charge, ' 1 the decision to prosecute may hinge on
the decision to take away the ability to possess a firearm. The
decision to remove firearms may be especially difficult in law
enforcement or military contexts.
124. DONALD G. DUrroN, RETHINKING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 252 (2006).
125. Id.
126. FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS, supra note 103, at 1.
127. United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 619 (8th Cir. 1999).
128. United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 2001).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2000).
130. Id. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii).
131. Eighth Amendment Challenges to § 922(g)(9) have been tried in the federal courts.
These suits have failed. See, e.g., United States v. Finnell, 256 F. Supp. 2d 493, 497 (E.D. Va.
2003) (denying proportionality review because the sentence was less than life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole).
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Congress may never have intended to "force an abuser out of
employment as an additional punishment for committing domestic
violence,""1 2 but that is the consequence of a misdemeanor domestic
violence conviction under § 922(g)(9) for law officers and military
service members who have been so convicted.133 Section 922(g)(9)
has had a chilling effect in its application toward law enforcement
officials who engage in domestic abuse. In a report for National
Public Radio, Wendy Kaufman found that the statute was "forc[ing]
police departments to confront the issue of domestic violence within
their ranks" and that "the law has had unintended consequences."1 4
The most significant consequence, according to Kaufman, was the
"chilling effect on the victims, because victims now are afraid to
come forward. They know that it could cost [the law enforcement
officer] his job."1 5 In jurisdictions where the prosecution does not or
cannot force the victim to testify against the offender, § 922(g)(9)
might actually reinforce a violent family situation.
The application of the three interpretations of "physical force" as
read into § 922(g)(9) would each differently affect the prosecution's
willingness to prosecute in these domestic violence situations. The
interpretation of United States v. Nason"6 is the most effective
when dealing with prosecutorial discretion in the domestic violence
situation. Discussing the charging decision, one commentator wrote:
The prosecutor is in the best position to perform the overall
analysis necessary to determine which cases may be suitable for
nontrial disposition. The prosecutor knows the full volume of
pending cases, the strengths and weaknesses of each particular
case and the need, if any, for the testimony of a particular
defendant to implicate [a] more culpable defendant. Only the
prosecutor has all the necessary information available to make
132. Lisa D. May, The Backfiring of the Domestic Violence Firearms Bans, 14 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 9 (2005) (citation omitted). May's discussion focuses on the judiciary's action
in "misapplying or refusing to apply state domestic violence laws" and does not focus on the
effect of prosecutorial discretion. Id. at 10. The applicability of these ideas to the prosecutorial
context is not difficult to see.
133. See White v. Dep't of Justice, 328 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
134. Morning Edition: Police and Domestic Violence (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 14, 2003),
available at http:lwww.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=1395242.
135. Id.
136. 269 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2001).
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this determination and, accordingly, the courts are inclined to
defer to his discretion.
137
Nason, to state it simply, provides the prosecutor the most
breadth to prosecute a domestic offender under the state law and
bring that offender under the gamut of the federal firearm ban. Its
analysis allows the prosecutor the widest leeway to consider the
judicial findings of the forum state and appropriately charge the
offender. Comparatively, Smith and Griffith, which found that a
conviction under any state statute with the element of physical force
will qualify,' may further provide a chilling effect on the prosecu-
tor because every conviction would result in a federal firearm
restriction. Belless might lead to overcharging the offenses because
it requires violent physical force for the federal statute to apply to
a convicted domestic offender,'39 and, absent such force, § 922(g)(9)
would be inapplicable.
The importance of knowing the impact and application of the
state law in charging is demonstrated in United States v. White,
140
a Fifth Circuit opinion dealing with § 922(g)(9) that has been
criticized for its holding.1 4' The court overturned Robert Allan
White's conviction for one count of violating § 922(g)(9) because his
prior misdemeanor convictions did not include the use or attempted
use of force as an element. 1
42
During a custody battle, White's estranged spouse alerted the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms that White had been
convicted of predicate offenses under state law and possessed nine
firearms.'14 White had two misdemeanor convictions under two
separate sections of the Texas Penal Code. One conviction resulted
from a violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.05(a), reckless conduct,
137. LAWLESS, supra note 120, at § 3.06 (citation omitted).
138. See United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Smith,
171 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1999).
139. See United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003).
140. 258 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2001).
141. For criticism of the holding, see Lininger, supra note 47, at 575-76.
142. White, 258 F.3d at 384.
143. Id. at 378-79 & 379 n.5.
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and the other for a violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.07(a)(2),
terroristic threat.
144
The Fifth Circuit drew an apt comparison to the language of the
Texas assault provision in the penal code.1 45 The Texas assault
statute contains language very similar to both Texas's reckless
conduct and terroristic threat provisions, but contains elements of
physical force. 146 Factual reiterations by the Fifth Circuit suggest
that White could have been charged under the assault statute with
the element of physical force, which would qualify his misdemeanor
conviction under § 922(g)(9). 47 In short, White demonstrates the
wide latitude the prosecutor has in charging a misdemeanant under
state law. Although there is no indication that the state pros-
ecutor considered § 922(g)(9) when making the charging decision,
a prosecutor versed in federal law has the same discretion in
charging and may consider such state law alternatives to charging
a misdemeanor, which would qualify for federal conviction under
§ 922(g)(9).
B. Prosecutorial Discretion and the Military
The military is often portrayed as a "special population" prone to
domestic violence. 4 ' Others have posited that the military is not
144. Id. at 381-82. Texas Penal Code § 22.05(a) reads, "A person commits an offense if he
recklessly engages in conduct that places another in imminent danger of serious bodily
injury." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.05(a) (Vernon 2003). The language of White's other
conviction, terroristic threat, also did not include an element of use or attempted use of
physical force: "[A] person commits an offense if he threatens to commit any offense involving
violence to any person or property with intent to ... place any person in fear of imminent
serious bodily injury." Id. § 22.07(a)(2).
145. White, 258 F.3d at 382 n.10.
146. Texas Penal Code § 22.01(a) reads:
(a) A person commits an offense if the person:
(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another,
including the person's spouse;
(2) intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury,
including the person's spouse; or
(3) intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the
person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact
as offensive or provocative.
147. White, 258 F.3d at 377.
148. See Christine Hansen, A Considerable Service: An Advocate's Introduction to Domestic
Violence and the Military, in II VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1-27, -29 (Joan Zorza ed., 2004).
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more disposed to violent behavior, but more informed, and has
gone public about the problem of domestic abuse in its ranks.149
Regardless, civilian and military sectors have large differences in
their treatments of domestic abuse. In state court prosecutions for
domestic violence, prosecutorial discretion may lead to ex parte
nullification by the prosecutor, the choice to charge a domestic
offender under alternate statutes without the use or attempted use
of force, or judicial nullification by the sitting judge. 0 The military,
however, has even broader discretion under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice' 5' to effectuate prosecutions for domestic violence
because of the structure of military justice in the Armed Forces.
Consider a hypothetical Army Company Commander faced with
a Military Police report that one of his soldiers has touched his wife
in an insolent and offensive manner during a domestic dispute. The
Commander faces a myriad of possibilities that include both judicial
and nonjudicial punishment.'52 Military Commanders, well aware
of the result should a soldier be convicted of a "misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence,"'5 3 must consider their choices carefully.
Nonjudicial punishment may lead to continued domestic problems
in the home; judicial punishment may lead to expulsion from the
military."'
The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for multiple levels
of courts martial, in increasing levels of seriousness: summary,
special, and general courts martial.'55 Summary courts martial
convictions are not "convictions" in the technical sense of the
word.'56 Only special and general courts martial qualify as federal
149. Deborah D. Tucker, a member of the Department of Defense Task Force on Domestic
Violence and former head of the National Training Center on Domestic and Sexual Violence
once stated, 'I think the difference might be that when the military knows about abusive
behavior, intervention at even relatively low levels of abuse tends to be much more swift and
complete." Linda D. Kozaryn, Task Force Calls for Crackdown on Domestic Violence, AM.
FORCES PRESS SERV., Mar. 9, 2001, available at http://www.defenselnk.mil]news/Mar200l/
n03092001_200103095.html.
150. See May, supra note 132, at 1-2.
151. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000).
152. Id. §§ 815, 822-24.
153. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2000).
154. 10 U.S.C. §§ 818-20.
155. Id. § 816.
156. See United States v. Rogers, 17 M.J. 990, 992 (A.C.M.R. 1984).
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offenses. 5 ' Additionally, the Uniform Code of Military Justice
allows for nonjudicial punishment imposed by military com-
manders.158 Article 15 punishments (nonjudicial punishment) also
do not constitute convictions under federal law.'59
Some military critics believe that the prosecution of domestic
violence offenses in the military has been unequal and almost
unsuccessful. 6 ' Furthermore, public opinion is often that military
commands do not consider the actual domestic violence offense but
other factors-such as cost of training recruits, time in service, and
military record-when making a determination to prosecute or not
to prosecute.16' This does not relate the entire picture, as "[n]o
commanding officers treat convictions identically."'62
Many considerations in a decision to prosecute a service member
go beyond mere consideration of service record or costs involved. In
light of all the possibilities and alternative forms of punishment
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, how does a military
commander and military prosecutor approach a domestic violence
situation in light of the current understanding of "physical force"
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)? A finding that any physical force
will qualify, as in Smith, Griffith, and Nason,16 1 may lead military
prosecutors to prosecute domestic offenders unevenly, leading to
increased use of nonjudicial punishment or summary courts martial;
under this regime any soldier convicted of domestic simple assault
could face prosecution under § 922(g)(9) for firearm possession. A
finding that only violent physical force qualifies, as in Belless,' may
lead to over-prosecution, because a proven simple assault may not
involve truly violent force, making § 922(g)(9) inapplicable.
Military justice is not dependent on state law. The Uniform Code
of Military Justice more clearly defines "physical force" in charges
157. Id.
158. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, REGULATION 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE 3-7 (Nov.
16, 2005), available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r27-10.pdf. This Article refers
only to Army regulations. Other services have appropriate counterpart publications.
159. United States v. Brown, 23 M.J. 149, 150 (C.M.A. 1987).
160. Hansen, supra note 148, at 1-29 to -30.
161. Id. at 1-33 to -35.
162. Casey Gwinn, Prosecuting an Abuser in the Military, in II VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN,
supra note 148, at 6-1, 6-3.
163. See supra Parts I.A, I.C.
164. See supra Part I.B.
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such as assault than the state laws discussed above. Article 128 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice outlines the requirements for
assault.16 According to the Manual for Courts Martial, simple
assault has two elements: (1) "[t]hat the accused attempted or
offered to do bodily harm to a certain person," and (2) "[t]hat the
attempt or offer was done with unlawful force or violence."'66 Under
this language, the level of physical force appears to be "violen[t]"
enough to cause "bodily harm." Although this language suggests a
higher threshold of physical force, the Manual for Courts Martial
clarifies that '[b]odily harm' means any offensive touching of
another, however slight,"'67 seemingly reducing that threshold to
any amount of physical force as long as it is "offensive." If the
Uniform Code of Military Justice allows for assault convictions
premised on any amount of force, commanders may be hesitant to
prosecute offenders within the military system. This hesitation
would be greater than if the civilian courts with concurrent
jurisdiction over the offense followed the analyses of Smith and
Griffith. In either situation, the domestic offender would be subject
to § 922(g)(9) upon any simple assault conviction. If the analysis
promulgated by the local federal courts followed either a Nason or
a Belless interpretation, commanders would be less hesitant to
allow prosecutions of domestic offenders in the civilian courts. In a
Nason jurisdiction, the state law may eliminate some of the de
minimis or offensive contact charges, whereas, in a Belless jurisdic-
tion, all nonviolent charges could not serve as a predicate offense to
§ 922(g)(9)'s firearms prohibitions.
Within the military justice system, allowing for prosecutorial and
command discretion in charging would allow for the most even
application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and § 922(g)(9).
In this case, the military prosecutor and commanding officer con-
sider the facts as they best understand them. As military justice is
command-driven, the Commander working closely with a domestic
offender in uniform and the military justice system may be in the
best position to seek the appropriate level of nonjudicial or judicial
punishment for the uniformed offender. The problem with broad
165. 10 U.S.C. § 928 (2000).
166. MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. IV, 54b(1)(a)-(b) (2005).
167. Id. 54c(1)(a).
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discretion is that it places huge importance on the decisions of a not
wholly impartial actor, the Commander, who may have difficulty
seeking the correct level of punishment for a soldier in a tight-knit
command.168
Despite some of the criticism, the military is not ignoring the
problem of domestic violence. As an indication of the military
culture imposing its own limitations on broad prosecutorial
discretion, military installations have entered into memoranda of
understanding with local communities and law enforcement agen-
cies to ensure that domestic violence is addressed in a judicial and
nonjudicial fashion.169 These memoranda include agreements to
ensure the "[p]rocessing and disposition of cases through the local
criminal justice systems and the corresponding military processing
and disposition of reported cases."'7 ° Such agreements indicate a
willingness on the part of the military to engage in understanding
and confronting the problem of domestic violence, including prosecu-
tions in civilian and military courts.
CONCLUSION
Section 922(g)(9) is a product of the infusion of state substantive
law into the federal criminal process. As a relatively new criminal
statute enacted to combat the problem of domestic violence in this
country, the statute continues to undergo judicial consideration and
interpretation to clarify its ambiguities. Although several circuits
have understood "physical force" under § 922(g)(9) to mean that any
amount of force will qualify a misdemeanant,' 7 ' that definition
has been narrowed by the Ninth Circuit.172 Different interpre-
tations of "physical force" will have (and have had) an effect on the
168. For prosecutors outside the military system who have begun prosecuting the military
offender, the command decision means little. As one prosecutor has stated, "[Tihe
commanding officer's reactions are not the [non-military] prosecutor's responsibility.
Prosecutors should do their jobs in prosecuting domestic violence cases and then allow the
military to do its job with the offender." Gwinn, supra note 162.
169. Chantal Escoto, Fort Campbell-Army's Pathfinders in Ending Abuse, THE LEAF-
CHRON., Apr. 13, 2005, at 1A.
170. Memorandum of Understanding from the Military/Civilian Coordinated Cmty.
Response Demonstration 3 (Apr. 12, 2005) (on file with author).
171. See United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Nason,
269 F,3d 10 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1999).
172. See United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003).
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prosecutions of domestic offenders under the statute. Because the
statute is one of the new breed of federal statutes based on state
substantive law, application of the statute from state to state may
be arbitrary. By attaching federal criminal sanctions to state
convictions, such varying outcomes are inevitable.
The practical effect of § 922(g)(9) has been to prohibit convicted
misdemeanant domestic offenders from purchasing firearms. Yet,
the federal courts prosecute few misdemeanants for possession of a
firearm. The federal courts will continue to be unable to prosecute
misdemeanant firearm possession under § 922(g)(9) if state
prosecutors are unwilling to bring simple assault and other charges
against offenders to avoid this ultimate, lifelong sanction.
Instead of ignoring the state court interpretations of the state's
own criminal statutes, federal courts applying § 922(g)(9) should
consider them. Consideration of the state court interpretation and
case law gives the state prosecutor the greatest ability to combat
domestic violence, choosing the most appropriate charge to prose-
cute. The state prosecutor is in the best position to determine
whether the domestic offender is a violent offender who will "reach
for the gun" or an offender whose actions are mildly offensive but
unlikely to lead to further violence. The decision in United States v.
Nason provides prosecutors that latitude, and the federal courts
should adopt its interpretation.173 In one sense, that adoption may
have little immediately discernable impact: just as the Nason court
found, even simple assault for "offensive touching" can satisfy the
physical force requirement. '74 Simple assault by "offensive touching"
may not satisfy the requisite level of force in other states, as the
Ninth Circuit determined in United States v. Belless.'75 By adopting
the Nason approach, state prosecutors are sure to know the ultimate
sanction against the offenders they prosecute, for the prosecutor
knows the level of force needed for a conviction. This adoption would
eliminate some of the concerns of the domestic violence cases that
fall into the "gray area" between truly violent contact and de
minimis touching and would lessen the concerns that law enforce-
ment and military service members could be terminated for their
173. 269 F.3d at 10; see supra Part I.C.
174. Nason, 269 F.3d at 18-19.
175. 338 F.3d at 1068-69.
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inability to carry a firearm upon conviction. If the current federal
law inserts some arbitrariness into the system based on its use of
state substantive law, that arbitrariness would be best controlled by
prosecutors, as they are best able to discern who should face the
indefinite prohibition on firearm possession. Absent such control,
the federal circuits will unevenly apply the law until Congress or
the Supreme Court provides a uniform interpretation.
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